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LOGIC ARGUMENTS __________________________________________________________________________ |
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ARGUMENTS FOR ATHEISM 1
__________________________________________________________________________ Is a Proof of the Non-Existence of a God Even Possible?Jeffery Jay Lowderwww.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/ipnegep.html If I were asked to prove that Zeus and Poseidon and Hera and the rest of the Olympians do not exist, I should be at a loss to find conclusive arguments. -- Bertrand Russell, "What Is an Agnostic?" 1953 [1] A common objection to atheism -- one stated by many scholars and laymen, theists and nontheists -- is that it is impossible to prove the non-existence of God. Yet the atheist response to this objection has been virtually non-existent.[2] This response is the purpose of this paper. Whether it is the responsibility of the methodological atheist to prove metaphysical atheism[3], and whether any atheists have actually proven the non-existence of any gods, are issues beyond the scope of this paper.[4] Rather, I want to examine the mere possibility of an atheological proof. I shall argue that there is no a priori reason why the disproof of a specific god is impossible. Mortimer AdlerIn his recent book Truth in Religion, Mortimer Adler distinguishes "logical disproof of religious belief" from universal negatives (or what he calls "negative existential propositions").[5] The former focuses on some proposition that is an "article of faith," a proposition that cannot be proved but can be "disproved by the proof of propositions that are their logical contraries or contradictories." For example, the Islamic belief that the prophet Muhammad received the Koran directly from Allah is classified by Adler as an "article of faith," because it cannot be proven. Yet, according to Adler, a disproof of an article of faith is possible. If a contradictory of an article of faith could be proven, then by the law of noncontradiction the article of faith would be disproven. Adler offers the following example of how an article of faith might be disproven by a contradictory: It may be useful here to offer an example, in the case of Christianity, of scientific and technological advances that may call an article of faith into question. If the prediction of computer technologists and researchers into artificial intelligence is ever realized -- that machines can be constructed in the future, the behavior of which will be indistinguishable from the behavior of human beings -- then the Christian belief in the immortality of the human soul will be challenged. That belief depends for its rational support on the immateriality of the human intellect. If purely material machines can do everything the human intellect can do, in a manner that is indistinguishable from the performance of the intellect, then there is no philosophical ground for affirming the immateriality of the intellect.[6] Yet Adler believes that this sort of disproof can only go so far. According to Adler, a "negative existential proposition," a proposition which "denies the existence of some thing," "cannot be proved." Just exactly why Adler believes this to be so is unclear, for he does not directly defend his claim. Perhaps Adler believes that negative existential propositions are not or cannot be disproven by proving contradictory, positive existential claims (which he admits can be supported "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Yet this position is false, for there are actually two ways to prove the non-existence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles[7], married bachelors, etc.). The other way is, in the words of Keith Parsons, "by carefully looking and seeing."[8] This is how we can know that such things as the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, the Abimonable Snowman, etc. do not exist. Using the first method, we learn that the existence of one possible god may entail the non-existence of one or more other possible gods. The god of Islam (Allah) and the god of Christianity (Jehovah), despite their common origin in the god of Judaism (Yahweh), are mutually exclusive. Jehovah and Allah, at least as traditionally understood, cannot both exist at the same time. Both claim to be the Creator of the universe, but they have contradictory attributes (e.g., Christianity claims that there are three "persons" known as God but Islam claims that there is only one). Thus, the Christian theist who makes the positive existential claim that the Christian god exists, is implicitly making the negative existential claim that all gods contradictory to the Christian god do not exist. Similarly, the Islamic theist who makes the positive existential claim that the Islamic god exists is implicitly claiming that all gods contradictory to Allah do not exist. And both the Christian and the Islamic theist presuppose the non-existence of the god of Deism, an impersonal Creator of the universe. Indeed, all of the theistic arguments for the existence of God have equivalent, negative existential propositions. For example:
But the most decisive refutation of Adler's claim that "negative existential propositions cannot be proven" is the fact that the claim that "negative existential propositions cannot be proven" is itself a negative existential proposition. If negative existential propositions cannot be proven, then that implies there are no proofs for negative existential propositions. But the claim that "there are no proofs for negative existential propositions" is itself a negative existential proposition. I therefore conclude that Adler's a priori objection to negative existential propositions fails. Hank Hanegraaff, Ron Rhodes, and Kenneth R. SamplesHank Hanegraaff, Ron Rhodes, and Kenneth R. Samples take a slightly different approach.[10] They argue that atheism is unknowable. This is because, in the words of Hanegraaff, Simply stated, a person would have to be omniscient and omnipresent to be able to say "there is no God" from his own pool of knowledge. Only someone capable of being in all places at the same time -- with a perfect knowledge of all that is in the universe -- can make such a statement based on the facts. In other words, a person would have to be God to say there is no God. Hence, the assertion is logically indefensible.[11] Yet it is not clear why the person who asserts that a particular god does not exist must be "capable of being in all places at the same time -- with a perfect knowledge of all that is in the universe." To be sure, theists who make the claim that "a specific god exists" do not feel that they must be omniscient and omnipresent. So why must the atheist be omniscient and omnipresent in order to affirm the opposite conclusion? Ron Rhodes has an answer to this question. He writes: This point can be forcefully emphasized by asking the atheist if he has ever visited the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. Mention that the library presently contains over 70 million items (books, magazines, journals, etc.). Also point out that hundreds of thousands of these were written by scholars and specialists in the various academic fields. Then ask the following question: "What percentage of the collective knowledge recorded in the volumes in this library would you say are within your own pool of knowledge and experience?" The atheist will likely respond, "I don't know. I guess a fraction of one percent." You can then ask: "Do you think it is logically possible that God may exist in the 99.9 percent that is outside your pool of knowledge and experience?" Even if the atheist refuses to admit the possibility, you have made your point and he knows it.[12] Of course, in response, the atheist could simply ask the theist, "Do you think it is logically possible that a knock-down, deductive disproof of your god may exist in the 99.9 percent that is outside your pool of knowledge and experience?" If the atheist is "dogmatic" for claiming that a god does not exist, is the theist also dogmatic for claiming that a god does exist? Of course not. Even in Rhodes' scenario, all that is necessary is that a particular god's existence logically imply something that we know is false within the .1% of knowledge that Rhodes says we have. It then logically follows -- we have a deductive proof -- that that particular god does not exist. If Rhodes is going to claim that all propositions having any kind of deductive relationship to "god exists" are outside of what we know, then Rhodes has the burden of proof to show that.[13] Bertrand RussellYet another objection to the possibility of an atheological proof can be found in the writings of Bertrand Russell. In order to understand the basis for Russell's objection, we must first understand how Russell defined the terms 'atheist' and 'agnostic': An atheist, like a Christian, holds that we can know whether or not there is a God. The Christian holds that we can know there is a God; the atheist, that we can know there is not. The Agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there are not sufficient grounds either for affirmation or for denial. At the same time, an Agnostic may hold that the existence of God, though not impossible, is very improbable; he may even hold it so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice. In that case, he is not far removed from atheism.[14] On Russell's view, while the agnostic who holds that the existence of a god "is so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice" is "not far removed" from the atheist who holds that we can know that god does not exist, apparently they are removed far enough for Russell to insist upon the distinction. Yet what is the distinction in question here? If the agnostic who holds that the existence of a god "is so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice" is not an atheist, then, on Russell's view, the atheist who holds that that same god does not exist must have a deductive proof for the non-existence of that god. But why must the person who claims that a specific god does not exist be able to prove so deductively? Russell never says. There is nothing inherent in the concept of a god that somehow makes it inappropriate to form probabilistic conclusions about the existence of that god, in the light of all the available evidence.[15] Moreover, what Russell wrote elsewhere seems to contradict his position: None of us would seriously consider the possibility that all the gods of Homer really exist, and yet if you were to set to work to give a logical demonstration that Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, and the rest of them did not exist you would find it an awful job. You could not get such proof.[16] Yet Russell does not state that he is "agnostic" concerning the existence of such a deductive proof; rather, he knows "you could not get such proof" even though he does not prove so deductively.[17] Granted, there may be no way to disprove certain interpretations of the Greek gods, if they are defined so that there are no contradictions either internally or with the observable world. But other possible gods are falsifiable. They have self-contradictory properties or logically entail empirical data other than what we in fact see, and Russell never demonstrates the impossibility of disproving those gods. The possibility of a logical disproof of one particular god does not depend upon the success of a logical disproof of another god. Dallas WillardA final objection to the possibility of an atheological proof perhaps may be found in Dallas Willard's commentary on the debate between J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen. I emphasize the word "perhaps" because it is unclear whether Willard is arguing that atheistic arguments are inherently more difficult to prove than theistic arguments in light of their negative existential status; Willard may believe that atheistic and theistic arguments are on equal footing in terms of what they must accomplish in order to be successful. Here is what Willard writes: ["There is no God"] is a negative existential, and looking for God here or there, finding or proving this not to be God and that not to be God, does nothing to budge it one bit toward or away from the status of knowledge or even of justified belief. To make any headway at all with the atheist's project, we will have to settle on some general considerations that will provide a structure within which particular facts may evidentially count for something. For example, take the general consideration that if God exists, suffering will not be allowed. Given this, the particular fact of this child being sexually abused by a drunken relative gains evidential significance for the existence or nonexistence of God. But then, of course, we have the task of securing the truth of this particular general consideration. A notoriously difficult undertaking![18] This, of course, is perfectly compatible with my earlier observation that there are two ways to prove something does not exist: one way is to demonstrate a logical contradiction and the other way is to simply look and see. Willard's "general considerations" are simply an analysis of the attributes of the object in question. To put it another way, Willard's "general considerations" are the prerequisites for both negative and positive existentials. We must have an adequate understanding of what an object's existence entails before we can argue for or against its existence. Positive existentials do not have an advantage over negative existentials in this sense. Willard suggests that "securing the truth" of his particular example of a general consideration, "that if God exists, suffering will not be allowed," will be "notoriously difficult." Now I would certainly join Willard in rejecting that particular consideration, for even theism is compatible with some suffering. But I would also suggest that there is some suffering -- namely, pointless suffering -- which is incompatible with theism. So let us consider a slightly modified version of Willard's example, "the general consideration that if God exists, no pointless suffering will be allowed." I think this consideration is fairly uncontroversial. Recent theistic scholarship on the argument from evil has not even questioned this consideration, much less deny it.[19] I therefore conclude that there is at least one such consideration -- agreed upon by both theists and atheists -- which demonstrates the possibility of an atheological argument. Moreover, with respect to the existence of a particular god, there is a sense in which negative existentials have an advantage over positive existentials. According to the principle of indifference, when we don't have any evidence favoring any of a set of alternatives over the others, we should count each alternative equally likely. Since there is literally an infinite number of logically possible gods, the prior probability of any individual god existing is very small.[20] ConclusionIn this paper, I have emphasized the possibility of disproving specific gods. I suspect that many people are under the false impression that the atheist is under some fictitious obligation to prove the non-existence of all possible gods in a single argument, in turn probably because many people conflate atheism with materialism.[21] I would be the first person to grant that there is probably not a single argument which proves the non-existence of all logically possible gods. But the existence of such an argument is not what the theism vs. atheism debate is all about. Rather, the issue is which, if any, logically possible gods exist. While some possible gods (e.g., the Greek Pantheon) do appear to be unfalsifiable, there does not appear to be any a priori reason why other possible gods cannot be disproved. AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to Jim Lippard, Mark Vuletic, Michael Martin, Theodore Drange, David McFadzean, Bill Schultz, and Rich Daniel for suggestions which improved this essay.
Notes[1] Bertrand Russell, "What Is an Agnostic?" The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn, New York: Touchstone, 1961), p. 577. [2] To my mind, the only atheist who has directly responded to this objection is Mark Vuletic. See his essay, "Is Atheism Logical?" (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/logical.html , 1996). I suppose that it might be objected that anyone who has published an argument for the nonexistence of a god has implicitly refuted the objection that such an argument is impossible. This is true, to the extent that such arguments are sound arguments. But the atheist response to the objection that "it is impossible to prove the non-existence of God" need not depend on the soundness of such arguments. Even if all arguments for the non-existence of gods failed, that would still not prove the impossibility of a sound argument for the non-existence of a god. [3] Methodological atheists, in contrast to metaphysical atheists, do not necessarily hold the positive belief that a particular god does not exist. A methodological atheist is simply a person who acts as if a god does not exist. [4] On the former, see "Does the Atheist Bear a Burden of Proof? A Reply to Prof. Ralph McInerny" (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_parsons/mcinerny.html, 1997), and God and the Burden of Proof (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1989), both by Keith M. Parsons. As for the latter, atheist philosophers are contributing a growing number of books and articles on atheological arguments. These arguments include divine incoherence arguments (see Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990], pp. 286-316), the atheistic teleological argument (Martin, pp. 317-333), the atheistic cosmological argument (see Quentin Smith, "Atheism, Theism, and Big Bang Cosmology" Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology [by William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 195- 217]), the evidential argument from evil (see esp. The Evidential Argument from Evil [Ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996]), the transcendental argument for the non-existence of God (see Michael Martin, "The Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God" http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martin-frame/tang.html , 1997), and the argument from nonbelief (see Theodore Drange, "The Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief" [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/aeanb.html , 1996] and Nonbelief and Evil [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, forthcoming]). [5] Mortimer Adler, Truth in Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 36. [6] Adler, pp. 31-32. [7] To be precise, it is quite easy to prove that two-dimensional "square circles" cannot exist. In contrast, as Richard Swinburne points out, proving the coherence of any proposition is very difficult because there always remains the possibility that an actual contradiction has not yet been discovered. See Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (revised ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 38-49. [8] Parsons 1989, p. 25. [9] According to the late Greg Bahnsen, "The claim of the presuppositionalist is there is no atheist in the world. There are people who profess atheism." See Bahnsen, Michael Martin Under the Microscope tape 1, (Nash, TX: Covenant Tape Ministry, n.d.), audiocassette. For a refutation of this argument, see Michael Martin, "Are There Really No Atheists?" (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/no_atheists.html , 1996). [10] Hank Hanegraaff, "The Folly of Denying God" Christian Research Newsletter (http://iclnet93.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-nwsl/crn0028a.txt , 1990); Ron Rhodes, "Strategies for Dialoguing with Atheists" (http://home.earthlink.net/~ronrhodes/Atheism.html , 1989); and Kenneth R. Samples, "Putting The Atheist on The Defensive" Christian Research Journal (http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-jrnl/crj0131a.txt , 1992). [11] Hanegraaff. Michael Martin, following the lead of Roland Puccetti, has developed an incoherence argument called "the argument from unrestricted existential statements" which attempts to demonstrate the incoherence of gods which purportedly have all factual knowledge. Martin argues that negative existential propositions are unknowable if they are completely unrestricted. See Martin, pp. 294-295. [12] Rhodes. [13] I am grateful to Jim Lippard for this argument. [14] Russell, p. 577. [15] See Michael Martin, The Big Domino in the Sky and Other Atheistic Tales (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1996), pp. 48-49. [16] Bertrand Russell, "Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic?" Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (ed. Al Seckel, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), p. 85. Italics are mine. [17] If Russell feels that he can know such a thing without deductive proof, then he cannot consistently insist that the atheist must have a deductive proof in order to know that a specific god does not exist. [18] Dallas Willard, "Language, Being, God, & the Three Stages of Theistic Evidence" in J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1991), p. 198. Boldface mine. [19] Instead, theists deny the existence of any actually pointless suffering. See Howard-Snyder, 1996. [20] A point of clarification is in order. It is not necessarily true that the low prior probability of a particular god existing constitutes an argument for the non-existence of a particular god. There are certain gods -- what we might call "hidden" gods -- whose existence would entail the state of affairs in which their prior probability is low and in which there is no evidence of their existence. To use prior probability to prove the non-existence of those gods would be logically fallacious. [21] Michael Martin, "Opening Statement by Michael Martin" The Fernandes-Martin Debate (www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/fernandes-martin/martin1.html, 1997) _______________________ "Is a Proof of the Non-Existence of a God Even
Possible?" is copyright © 1998 by Jeffery Jay Lowder.
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What, then, are the atheological arguments?
The following is a partial list: ·
Arguments
from Confusion: confusion about morality and among
religious believers is evidence for atheism ·
Atheistic
Cosmological Argument: according to this argument, Big Bang
cosmology is evidence that God does not exist. ·
Arguments
from Divine Hiddenness and Nonbelief: the reasonableness
of nonbelief is evidence for atheism ·
Argument
from Evil: evil is evidence for the nonexistence of God ·
Argument
from Evolution: evolution is evidence for atheism ·
Arguments
from Incoherence: also known as 'incompatible-properties
arguments,' these arguments attempt to derive a contradiction in the
concept of God. ·
Atheistic
Moral Arguments: according to this family of arguments,
some claim about morality (the impossibility of a being worthy of
worship, the nonexistence of objective moral values, etc.) is evidence
for the nonexistence of God ·
Argument
from Physical Minds: the physical dependence of minds upon
the brain is evidence for atheism Other atheological arguments (not
yet discussed on the Secular Web) include the argument from pain and
pleasure, and the argument from flourishing and languishing. (See our call
for papers if you are interested in contributing a paper on one of
these arguments.) To see how these and other arguments can be used to
build a cumulative case for naturalism (the view that there are no
supernatural beings), see The
Lowder-Fernandes Debate. __________________________________________________________________________
Proving a NegativeRichard Carrier www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/theory.html I know the myth of "you can't prove a negative" circulates throughout the nontheist community, and it is good to dispel myths whenever we can. As it happens, there really isn't such a thing as a "purely" negative statement, because every negative entails a positive, and vice versa. Thus, "there are no crows in this box" entails "this box contains something other than crows" (in the sense that even "no things" is something, e.g. a vacuum). "Something" is here a set restricted only by excluding crows, such that for every set S there is a set Not-S, and vice versa, so every negative entails a positive and vice versa. And to test the negative proposition one merely has to look in the box: since crows being in the box (p) entails that we would see crows when we look in the box (q), if we find q false, we know that p is false. Thus, we have proved a negative. Of course, we could be mistaken about what we saw, or about what a crow is, or things could have changed after we looked, but within the limits of our knowing anything at all, and given a full understanding of what a proposition means and thus entails, we can easily prove a negative in such a case. This is not "proof" in the same sense as a mathematical proof, which establishes that something is inherent in the meaning of something else (and that therefore the conclusion is necessarily true), but it is proof in the scientific sense and in the sense used in law courts and in everyday life. So the example holds because when p entails q, it means that q is included in the very meaning of p. Whenever you assert p, you are also asserting q (and perhaps also r and s and t). In other words, q is nothing more than an element of p. Thus, all else being as we expect, "there are big green Martians in my bathtub" means if you look in your bathtub you will see big green Martians, so not seeing them means the negative of "there are big green Martians in my bathtub." Negative statements often make claims that are hard to prove because they make predictions about things we are in practice unable to observe in a finite time. For instance, "there are no big green Martians" means "there are no big green Martians in this or any universe," and unlike your bathtub, it is not possible to look in every corner of every universe, thus we cannot completely test this proposition--we can just look around within the limits of our ability and our desire to expend time and resources on looking, and prove that, where we have looked so far, and within the limits of our knowing anything at all, there are no big green Martians. In such a case we have proved a negative, just not the negative of the sweeping proposition in question. The Method of the Best BetLogicians note that it is easier to prove that there are such beings than to prove there aren't simply because we only need to find one of them to accomplish our proof, and thus will not have to look everywhere--unless we are so unlucky that where the one Martian is just happens to be the last place we look. But in the final analysis, it is not being "negative" that makes a proposition difficult to prove, but the breadth of the assertion. For instance, "there is gravity on every planet in every universe" could be disproven by searching just one planet and finding no gravity, but if we kept finding gravity we could never decisively prove it true, any more than if we kept failing to find Martians in the universe would we be able to decisively prove that "there are no Martians in the universe." Thus, what people call the "you can't prove a negative" axiom is actually nothing more than the eternal problem of induction: since we can't test a proposition in every place and at every time, we can never be absolutely certain that the proposition remains true in all times and places. We can only infer it. In computers this sort of proof (of the positive or negative variety) results in an infinite loop (or quasi-infinite loop), and clever programmers can give software the tools to recognize such routines before executing them. Then, instead of executing them, they have them execute a simpler subroutine that equates to a "best guess." Not surprisingly, we all do the same thing: since we have neither the ability nor the desire to devote a dangerous proportion of our time and resources to testing every proposition of this kind, we adopt a simpler rule: given insufficient evidence, then no belief. This is the same thing as "given sufficient evidence, then belief," since insufficient evidence is the same thing as sufficient evidence for denial. This amounts to a "best guess" solution, where we recognize that a statement may be true, but have insufficient grounds to believe it. Or, in the case of propositions for which we have abundant but incomplete proof, we recognize that it may be false, but have insufficient grounds to disbelieve it. This is the basic principle behind all hypothetical thought, from the theories of science, to the "sun will come up tomorrow" variety of common sense. Given the set of all propositions of the first kind (where there is a lack of evidence despite some reasonable measure of checking), nearly all of them are false, so it is a safe bet to assume they are all false until proven otherwise. Conversely, given the set of all propositions of the second kind (where there is continuous evidence after some reasonable measure of checking), nearly all of them are true, so it is a safe bet to assume they are true until proven otherwise. Unprovable StatementsConsider the negative case. When it comes time to decide what to believe, if we did not assume such "unprovables" were false, we would either have to choose which unprovables to believe by some totally arbitrary means, which amounts to a ridiculous "belief by whim" method, or else we have to assume that all such statements are true. Of course, we only have to believe true those unprovables that do not contradict other proven statements or that do not contradict each other, but even in the latter case we have no grounds for choosing which of two contradictory unprovables we will believe, and this is the same "belief by whim" dilemma. But even with these provisions, this policy would result in a great number of absurd beliefs (like "there are big green Martians in the universe"). Thus, when finally deciding what to believe, it is clear that the best policy is to assume that all unprovables are false, until such time as they are proved. In other words, it is reasonable to disbelieve a proposition when there is no evidence. Even if it is less certainly false than propositions which are actually contradicted by evidence (although even that does not amount to a complete certainty), it is still reasonable to regard them as false so long as we've done some checking, and don't ignore new evidence that we come across. A similar line of reasoning establishes the opposite in all positive cases. If we did not assume all such unprovables were true, we would either have to choose which unprovables to disbelieve by some totally arbitrary means, which again amounts to a ridiculous "belief by whim" method, or else we have to assume that all such statements are false. Of course, it would be plainly absurd to believe that all the statements for which we have some evidence are false. Although "absolute skeptics" actually claim to assume this, they put in place of truth a concept of assent which amounts to the same solution as I have discussed above: betting on the truth of a statement that we have many reasons to believe but can never be certain of. Thus, when finally deciding what to believe, it is clear that the best policy is to assume that all unprovables for which we have good evidence are true, until such time as they are disproved. In other words, it is reasonable to believe a proposition when there is good evidence. Even if it is less certainly true than propositions which are actually irrefutable, such as mathematical truths or "I am thinking, therefore I am," it is still reasonable to regard them as true so long as we've done some checking, and don't ignore new evidence that we come across. In all cases, we can perhaps move the bar up and down--changing the amount of "checking" that counts as reasonable and sufficient before resolving to believe--but this affects all our beliefs, as the bar cannot be set differently for different things without again engaging in "belief by whim" methods, and we will all find that there is such a thing as having the bar too low or too high, as one can find through the same reasoning as I have engaged in here. The Unbelievability of Christian TheismChristian Theism in its most basic sense entails observations that would necessarily be made by everyone everywhere and at all times, and thus it is as easily disproven as the alien in the bathtub. For instance, God is theoretically omnipresent, and granted us the ability to know him (to feel his loving presence, etc.), yet I have absolutely no sensation of any God or anything that would be entailed by a God, even though by definition he is within me and around me wherever I go. Likewise, God is theoretically the epitome of compassion, and also all-knowing and all-powerful and beyond all injury, yet I know that what demonstrates someone as compassionate is the alleviation of all suffering known to them and safely within their power to alleviate. All suffering in the world must be known and safely within the power of God to alleviate, yet it is still there, and since the Christian 'theory' entails the opposite observation, Christianity is false. Likewise, God theoretically designed the universe for a moral purpose, but the universe lacks moral features--animals thrive by survival of the fittest, not survival of the kindest, and the laws of physics are no respecter of persons, they treat the good man and the bad man equally. Moreover, the universe behaves like a mindless machine, and exhibits no intelligent action of its own accord, and there are no messages or features of a linguistic nature anywhere in its extra-human composition or behavior, such as we would expect if a thinking person had designed it and wanted to communicate with us. Christians attempt to preserve their proposed theory by moving it into the set of unprovables that lack all evidence. They do this arbitrarily, and for no other reason than to save the proposed theory, by creating impassable barriers to observation, just as requiring us to look in every corner of every universe creates an impassable barrier for one who is asked to decisively disprove the statement "there are big green Martians." For instance, the advanced theory holds that God alleviates suffering in heaven, which we conveniently cannot observe, and he has reasons for waiting and allowing suffering to persist on Earth, reasons which are also suitably unobservable to us, because God chooses not to explain them, just as he chooses, again for an unstated reason that is entirely inscrutable, to remain utterly invisible to all my senses, external and internal, despite being always around and inside me and otherwise capable of speaking to me plainly. The problem is not, as some theists think, that we can find no explanations to "rationalize" a god in this world of hurt. I can imagine numerous gods who would be morally justified and even admirable, and others who would be neither evil nor good, and still others who are evil, but none of these would be the Christian god. The fact is that Christianity is the proposal of a theory, and like all theories, it entails predictions--but these predictions are not being born out. So Christians invent excuses to save the theory--excuses which have absolutely no basis in any evidence or inference, except the sole fact that they rescue the theory. This is Ptolemy's epicycles all over again: the motions of the planets and sun refused to fit the theory that they all revolve around the Earth, so Ptolemy invented numerous complex patterns of motion that had no particular reason to happen other than the fact that they rescue the theory of geocentricity. It is simply far wiser to conclude that instead of this monstrously complex and bizarre architecture of groundless saving suppositions, it makes far more sense, and uses far fewer suppositions, to simply admit that the universe doesn't revolve around the Earth after all. As for all the other theories--all the other possible gods--there is no more evidence for them than for this incredibly complex deity with a dozen strange and mysterious reasons that only too conveniently explain why we never observe him or his actions in any clear way. Of course, even these groundless "solutions" to the Christian 'theory' do not really save the theory, because, to maintain it, at some point you must abandon belief in God's omnipotence--since at every turn, God is forced to do something (to remain hidden and to wait before alleviating suffering, etc.) by some unknown feature of reality, and this entails that some feature of reality is more powerful than God. And this feature cannot merely be God's moral nature, since if that were his only limitation, there would then be no barrier to his speaking to me or acting immediately to alleviate suffering or designing the universe to have overtly moral or linguistic features, since any truly moral nature would compel, not prevent, such behavior. Thus, the Christian hypothesis is either incoherent or unprovable, and in the one case it is necessarily false, while in the other it lacks justification, so we have no reason to believe it, any more than we have a reason to believe that there is a big green Martian on some planet in some corner of some universe. This is what it means to "prove a negative." |
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__________________________________________________________________________ Refutations
of Arguments for God's Existence www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/fernandes-martin/martin1.html www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/fernandes-martin/
Once Dr. Fernandes' misunderstandings are put to one side, there remain three basic arguments for existence of God in his opening statement. It is easy to show that none of these are successful. 1. The Kalam Cosmological Argument. According to Dr. Fernandes the Kalam cosmological argument demonstrates the existence of God. This is the argument that (1) the universe began in time, that (2) this beginning was caused, and that (3) this cause was God. I am willing to grant (1) although I believe that this premise is much more controversial than Dr. Fernandes supposes.[5] The other two premises I do not grant. First of all, the universe could arise spontaneously, that is, "out of nothing." Several well known cosmologists have embraced this view and it is not to be dismissed as impossible.[6] In particular, Dr. Fernandes misunderstands modern science very badly in supposing that embracing such a view would "destroy the pillars of modern science." It is simply not the case that modern science assumes that everything has a cause. Second, the cause of the universe need not be God. It could be a malevolent being or an impersonal force or a plurality of gods or a finite God. Of course, Dr. Fernandes uses other considerations to support his theistic interpretation of the cause of the Big Bang. But these considerations are not well argued for. For example, he maintains that intelligence cannot come from non-intelligence; hence human intelligence cannot come from a mindless universe. However, no good reason is given for this claim and, in any case, a nonmindless universe is compatible with other hypotheses beside theism, for example, polytheism. Third, it is unclear how God could have caused the Big Bang since time is supposed to have been created in the Big Bang. God cannot have caused the universe in any sense one can understand since a cause is normally temporally prior to its effect. In particular, causation in terms of intentions and desires are temporally prior to their effects. God's desires and intentions therefore cannot be the cause of the Big Bang. 2. St. Thomas' Five Ways According to Fernandes, Aquinas' Five Ways demonstrate God's existence by showing that dependent beings are dependent on an Independent Being, namely, God. However, this is a misconstrual of Aquinas. Only in his Third Way--an argument from contingent beings to a Necessary Being--does Aquinas come close to Dr. Fernandes' construction. However, Aquinas' Third Way commits the fallacy of composition--it assumes that a necessary whole cannot be made of contingent parts. Furthermore, once explicated, this argument contains several other dubious premises.[7] Aquinas's argument also assumes without warrant that a Necessary Being must have all of the attributes of God. In any case, Fernandes' interpretation of Aquinas in terms of dependency has precisely the same problems as Aquinas' argument.[8] 3. The Design Argument Dr. Fernandes argues that it is astonishingly unlikely that life could have arisen by chance and cites a number of seemingly impressive statistics to support his case. He then concludes that God must be the cause of life in the universe. However, there are at least three problems with his argument. a. Probability estimates are meaningful only given certain assumptions. The probability estimates to which he refers seem to be based on the classical theory of probability: the ratio of the possibilities favorable to life to all possibilities. However, this theory can only be applied if we have good reason to suppose that the possibilities are equally likely. But we have no reason to make this assumption in this case. On the other hand, the frequency theory of probability cannot apply either. On this theory, probability is the frequency in which a type of event occurs within a class of events. For example, in the case of life this might be the frequency of universes with life generated by big bangs that occur within the class of all universes generated by big bangs. However, there only is evidence of one universe generated by the Big Bang. Given these considerations Dr. Fernandes' example of a Boeing 747 created from a junkyard by a tornado is misplaced. Here there is ample evidence that the frequency of Boeing 747s in class of events brought about by tornadoes is zero. b. However, let us grant one could make the probability estimates consider above. There are several hypotheses cosmologists have constructed to explain life that have nothing to with supernatural beings. For example, cosmologists have developed a model in terms of so called "world ensembles." They have conjectured that our world--our galaxy and the other galaxies--may be one among many alternative worlds or universes existing at the same time. On this view THE UNIVERSE as a whole is composed of a vast number of such worlds or universes, the overwhelming majority of these are lifeless since the various demands that are required for life as we understand it are not met in them. However, given enough universes it is very likely that in some of the complex conditions that are necessary for life would be found. We happen to be in such a universe. c. Finally, even if naturalistic models are dismissed, Fernandes' conclusion that God exists does not follow from his premises. Intelligent design in the universe is compatible with many different hypotheses including polytheism, deism and a finite and evil god. Three Arguments for AtheismWith Dr. Fernandes' misunderstandings out of the way and his major arguments refuted I will briefly consider three arguments for atheism. The Argument from Incoherence (AFI) One good reason to not believe that God exists is that the concept of God is incoherent. The concept of God is like a round square or the largest number. AFI can be formulated in two ways: According to one formulation of AFI, some of the properties attributed to God in the Bible are inconsistent.[9] For example, God is said to be invisible (Col. 1:15, ITi 1:17, 6:16), a being that has never been seen (John 1:18, IJo 4:12). Yet several people in the Bible report seeing God, for instance Moses (Ex 33:11, 23), Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Ge. 12:7, 26:2, Ex 6:3). God is supposed to have said "you cannot see my face, for no one can see me and live" (Ge 32:30), However, Jacob saw God and lived. (Ge 32:30). In some places God is describe as a merciful[10] and in other places as lacking mercy,[11] in some places as a being who repents and changes His mind,[12] in other places as a being who never repents and changes His mind,[13] in some places as a being who deceives and causes evil,[14] and in other places as a being who never does,[15] in some places as a someone who punishes children for their parents wrong doing[16] and in other places as one who never does.[17] On another formulation of AFI attributes specified in philosophical accounts of God are either in conflict with one another or are internally inconsistent. In Atheism I spend thirty pages analyzing in detail the incoherence connected with the concepts of omniscience, omnipotence, and divine freedom. Here I only have space to outline my arguments connected with omniscience. 1. In one important sense, to say that God is omniscient is to say that God is all knowing. To say that God is all knowing entails that He has all of the knowledge that there is. Now philosophers have usually distinguished three different kinds of knowledge: propositional, procedural and knowledge by acquaintance. Briefly, propositional or factual knowledge is knowledge that something is the case and is analyzable as true belief of a certain kind. In contrast, procedural knowledge or knowledge how is a type of skill and is not reducible to propositional knowledge. Finally, knowledge by acquaintance is direct acquaintance with some object, person or phenomenon. For example, to say "I know Mr. Jones" implies that one has not just detailed propositional knowledge about Mr. Jones but direct acquaintance with Mr. Jones. Similarly, to say "I know poverty" implies that, besides detailed propositional knowledge of poverty, one has some direct experience of it. To say that God is all knowing, then, is to say that God has all knowledge where this includes propositional, procedural and knowledge by acquaintance. However, theists have not noticed the implications of this account for the existence of God. God's omniscience conflicts with His disembodiness. If God is omniscient, then on this definition God would have all knowledge including that of how to swim. Yet only a being with a body can have such knowledge in the procedural sense, that is actually have the skill, and by definition God does not have a body. Therefore, God's being disembodied and God's being omniscient are in conflict. Thus, if God is both omniscient and disembodied, God does not exist. Since God is both omniscient and disembodied He does not exist. The property of being all knowing also conflicts with certain moral attributes usually attributed to God. If God is omniscience, He has knowledge by acquaintance of all aspects of lust and envy. But one aspect of lust and envy is the feelings of lust and envy. However, part of the concept of God is that He is morally perfect and being morally perfect excludes these feelings. Consequently, there is a contradiction in the concept of God. God, because He is omniscient, must experience the feeling of lust and envy. But God, because He is morally perfect, is excluded from doing so. Consequently, God does not exist. In addition, God's omniscience conflicts with His omnipotence. Since God is omnipotent He cannot experience fear, frustration, and despair. For in order to have these experiences one must believe that one is limited in power. But since God is all knowing and all powerful, He knows that He is not limited in power. Consequently, He cannot have complete knowledge by acquaintance of all aspects of fear, frustration and despair. On the other hand, since God is omniscient He must have this knowledge. Of course, one can imagine various objections to these three arguments. However, these objections can be met and an extended refutation of them can be found in my book.[18] Perhaps the most commonly voiced criticism should be mentioned here. One might object that God's knowledge should not include knowledge by acquaintance and all knowledge how since it is not logically possible for God to have all knowledge by acquaintance and all knowledge how. Thus, God's knowledge should be limited to factual knowledge. The trouble with this reply, however, is that it committed to the view that it is logically impossible for God to have knowledge that it is logically possible for humans to have. The result is paradoxical to say the least. One normally supposes that the following is true: (1) If person P is omniscient, then P has knowledge that any nonomniscient being has. Furthermore, one normally supposes that the following is true: (2) If God exists, God has all knowledge that humans have. But both (1) and (2) are false given the restriction of God's knowledge to factual knowledge. However, even if we restrict God's knowledge to propositional knowledge, the concept of God is still incoherent. I only have space here to consider one argument that can be adduced to show that it is logically impossible for God to be omniscient in this sense.[19] Consider a neglected argument of Roland Puccetti[20] that I reconstruct as follows: If P is omniscient, then P would have knowledge of all facts about the world. Let us call this totality of facts Y. So if P is omniscient, then P knows Y. One of the facts included in Y is that P is omniscient. But in order to know that P is omniscience P would have to know something besides Y. P would have to know: (Z) There are no facts unknown to P But how can Z be known? Puccetti argues that Z cannot be known since Z is an unrestricted negative existential statement. He admits that it is possible to know the truth about those negative existential statements that are restricted temporally and spatially. But Z is a negative existential that is completely uncircumscribed. Knowing Z, Puccetti says, would be like knowing it is true that no centaurs exist anywhere at any time. But why could not God with his infinite power search all of space and time and conclude that there are no centaurs? Similarly, why could not God search all space and time and conclude that there is no more factual knowledge that He can acquire? Puccetti is not as clear as he might be but one can assume that he would answer this question by saying that God could not exhaustively search space and time because they are both infinite. No matter how long God searched there would be more space and time to search. Consequently, it is possible that there are facts He does not know. Thus, for God to know that He knows all the facts located in space and time is impossible, and since omniscience entails such knowledge, omniscience is impossible. Now it may be objected that God will know that Z because He is the sole creator of the totality of facts (other than himself). But this reply begs the question. How could God know that He is the sole creator of the totality of facts unless He also knew Z? But since Z cannot be known, God cannot know He is the sole creator of the totality of facts. This reconstruction of Puccetti's argument turns on the factual assumptions that space and time are infinite but some scientists have claimed that space is finite but unbounded. The infinite nature of time is also controversial. At most, then, the argument prove that if space and time are infinite, then God is not omniscient. But since God is omniscient by definition, He cannot exist if space and time are infinite. However, there is a realm of knowledge that is uncontroversially infinite. If God is omniscient, He will know all mathematical facts and know that there are no mathematical facts that He does not know. In order to know all mathematical facts however, it is necessary to investigate all mathematical entities and the relations between and among them. But the number of mathematical entitiesand relations is infinite. So even God cannot complete such an investigation. We can conclude, then, that given the existence of an infinite number of mathematical entities, God is not omniscient; hence, if omniscience is an attribute of God, He does not exist. Since omniscience is an attribute of God, He does not exist. The Argument From Evil (AE) Another good reason to disbelieve in God is the existence of the large amount of evil in the world. How can a perfectly good and all powerful being allow this evil? The simplest and most plausible explanation of this evil is that God does not exist. In his opening statements Dr. Fernandes dismisses this argument, maintaining that atheists have "no basis to call anything evil."[21] However, as already noted, this is based on the misunderstanding that atheists have no objective grounds to make moral judgments. In his unpublished manuscript, The God Who Sits Enthroned, Dr. Fernandes is less dismissive and proposes some solutions. With respect to moral evil--the evil brought about by human beings--Dr. Fernandes uses the Free Will Defense (FWD) to try to overcome the difficulty: moral evil is not to be blamed on God but is the result of human's misuse of their free will. I have argued in detail in Atheism that this defense is severely flawed and can only briefly outline my main points here. 1. The FWD presupposes contracausal freedom (CCF), in other words that human decisions are not caused by any events in our brains or nervous systems. However, there is no scientific reason to suppose that CCF is true. 2. God could have created human beings with a tendency to do good. This would be compatible with CCF and would have produced less evil. 3. God could have produced human beings with CCF who would be less vulnerable to physical attack, for example, human beings with bulletproof skin. 4. God could have created natural laws that make it harder than it actually is for one human being to inflict harm on other human beings, for example, laws that prevent the making of explosives. This would have been compatible with CCF and would have prevented much evil. 5. There is a distinction between the decision D to do an act A and the outcome O of A. God could have allowed people to exercise their CCF in D and yet have ameliorated the harmful outcomes O of A by divine intervention. 6. The FWD assumes that the exercise of free will is worth the price of millions of deaths and untold suffering. This is a doubtful assumption. 7. Although God is not directly responsible for evil on the FWD defense, He is indirectly responsible. Presumably He has foreknowledge and knows that His creatures will misuse their CCF. In this case, God is reckless and if He does not have foreknowledge, He knows at least that this misuse is possible and yet took no safeguards to prevent it. In this case, God is negligent. In his unpublished manuscript Dr. Fernandes suggests a variety of strategies for solving the problem of natural evil, that is, evil not brought about by human action, for example, earth quakes, tidal waves, genetic deformities. For example, he suggests that natural evil is necessary for moral perfection, that demons cause natural evil, that natural evil is warning that greater evil would follow, that evils such as the suffering of animals are necessary in the present state of the world. I am afraid that none of these suggestions will do.[22] 1. Natural evil may be necessary in the present state of the world. However, an all powerful God need not be limited to this world but is capable of actualizing a possible world with different laws. 2. When Dr. Fernandes suggests that demons cause natural evil, he is simply assimilating the problem of natural evil to the problem of moral evil: natural evil is the result of the free will of demons. In this case, all of the problems of the FWD apply and there are additional problems as well.[23] 3. The suggestion that evil is a warning has at least two problems. First, it is difficult to see why evils such as genetic birth defectsare a warning to the innocent children who have them or to those parents who may have lead morally upright lives. Second, an all powerful God could warn people in ways that were less destructive and ambiguous. For example, he could speak to directly to them or send heavenly messengers. 4. The idea that evil is necessary for moral perfection also has great problems. First, a flood or tidal wave that kills thousands of children is hardly character building of those children. With respect to the people who survive, for example the parents of the children, instead of strenthening their character, the trauma may just as well crush them beyond recovery. Second, an all powerful God could have provided opportunities for moral development without causing so much pain and suffering, including the killing of the innocent. The Argument from Nonbelief (ANB) Still another reason for disbelieving in God is the large number of disbelievers in the world.[24] ANB is especially telling against evangelical Christianity although it has some force against other religions, for example, Orthodox Judaism.[25] Evangelical Christianity is the view that (1) God is merciful and all-loving God, compassionate and caring towards humanity, (2) the Bible and only the Bible is the source of God's word, (3) God wants all humans to be saved, (4) a necessary condition for being saved is becoming aware of the word of God and accepting it. Supposing evangelical Christianity to be true, it is difficult to understanding why there are nearly one billion nonbelievers in the world. Why would a merciful God, a God who wants all humans to be saved, not provide clear and unambiguous information about His word to humans when having this information is necessary for salvation? Yet, as we know, countless millions of people down through history have not been exposed to the teaching of the Bible and those that have been are often exposed in superficial and cursory ways, ones not conducive to acceptance. Even today there are millions of people who, through no fault of their own, either remain completely ignorant of the Christian message or because of a seriously lack in their Christian education reject it. One would expect that if God was rational, He would have arranged things in such a way that there would more believers. Here are a few obvious ideas about how this could have been done: 1. God could have made the Bible more plausible. He could have make it free from contradiction and factual errors. He could have seen to it that it contains clear and unambiguous and correct prophecies and no false and ambiguous ones. 2. God could have provided people with exposure to the Bible's message by having Bibles appear in every household in the world written in a language that the occupants could read. 3. God could have spoken from the Heavens in all known languages so that no human could doubt His existence and His message. 4. God could have sent angels disguised as human preachers to spread His word and given them the power to perform unambiguous miracles and works of wonder. 5. God could have implanted a belief in God and His message in everyone's mind. 6. In recent times God could have communicated with millions of people by interrupting prime time TV programs and given His message. Any and all of these ideas and countless others that I have not mentioned would have increased the number of believers and presumably the number of saved people. Yet, God has used none of these. There are a number of defenses against ANB that I should briefly mention. I. The Free Will Defense: Theists might argue that God wants His creatures to believe in God without any coercion. The above suggestions, it might be said, involve forcing people to believe in God and this would interfere with their free will. However, none of the above suggestions about how God could have increased peoples' belief in God interferes with their free will. For example, if people are provided with clear and unambiguous evidence of His existence, this hardly interferes with their freewill since they can reject this evidence. In fact, in the Bible God is said to have performed spectacular miracles that influenced people to believe in Him. For example, in Ex 7:5 God performed a miracle to demonstrate to the Israelites that He was the true God. Even if God implanted a belief of God in people's minds, they could reject the implanted idea. Moreover, it makes no sense to suppose that a rational God would create human beings in His own image and yet expect them to believe in Him without strong evidence, that is, to be irrational. 2. The Testing Defense: One version of the testing defense that is used by evangelical Christians is that evidence for God is clear and unambiguous but humans have rejected it because of a spiritual defect such as false pride. Those who accept the evidence show that they do not have a spiritual defect and those who fail the test show that they do. However, there is no reason to suppose that evidence for God is convincing or that people reject it because of a spiritual defect. Another more plausible hypothesis is that the evidence for God is utterly unconvincing. In addition, even if it is convincing, billions of people because of their background or circumstances have not been exposed to it. Moreover, if the Bible is convincing in principle and humans have been exposed to it, they may not see this because of their faulty reasoning. It is grossly unfair to punish people for not believing in God either because they have not been exposed to His teachings or because of errors of reasoning. 3. The Unknown Purpose Defense: Theists might argue that God has some unknown reason for permitting so many nonbelievers. In reply to this defense one could argue that theists have the burden of proof of showing there is an unknown purpose. First, God commanded all people to love Him and to believe in His son. Second, the Bible says that the love God commandment is the greatest of all commandments--not to be overridden by another. Third, Jesus said He came to the world to testify to the truth--the gospel message. Again His mission is presumably not to be overridden by other purposes. These reasons indicate that there is strong scriptural support for there being no unknown reason for the existence of so many nonbelievers. In addition, God has further properties that make His having an unknown purpose for permitting so much nonbelief implausible. For example, according to evangelical Christianity, God wants humans to love Him. How can He want this and yet fail to make billions of humans aware of the gospel message since loving Him presupposes being aware of His message? The appeal to unknown purposes at worse makes God appear irrational and at best creates a mystery that detracts from the explanatory power of theism. Conclusion Dr. Fernandes claims that he cannot prove the existence of God with rational certainty but that the cumulative case for theism is far superior to the case for atheism. On the contrary, his case for theism is extremely weak: his three main arguments fail completely and his other points are based on misunderstandings of atheism. He may realize this for in the last paragraph of his opening statement he beseeches his readers to choose God by utilizing Pascal's Wager--a pragmatic argument for God that is normally used when rational epistemic arguments fail. However, Dr. Fernandes seems to be unaware of the many problems with this argument--one of them being that God might reserve a special place in Hell for those people who choose God because of Pascal's Wager![26] Notes[1] After all, God may have good reasons for not providing us with reliable knowledge. If God has unknown but good reasons for allowing evil, He could have good but unknown reasons for allowing such an epistemological gap. [2] See Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Temple University Press, 1990), Introduction. [3] See Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton, (Oxford University Press, 1997) [4] Atheism, pp. 13-23 [5] See the debate between Craig and Smith in William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology (Clarendon Press, 1993). [6] See Graham Oppy, "Professor William Craig's Criticism of Critiques of Kalam Cosmological Arguments by Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking and Adolf Grunbaum," Faith and Philosophy, 12. 1995, pp. 237 -250 [7] See Atheism, Chapter 4. [8] The same thing is true of an Independent Being. A being that is independent simply means that it is not dependent for its existence on other beings. Nothing follows about its moral attributes, let alone its power or knowledge. Dr. Fernandes commits the fallacy of composition, that is arguing from a property of part to a property of a whole. Just because the men who make up an army are weak it does not follow that the army is weak. In a similar way it does not follow that if the parts of a whole are dependent, then the whole is. [9] I am indebted here to Ted Drange's unpublished manuscript Nonbelief and Evil (pp. 37-38) [10] Ps 86:5, 100:5, 103:8, 106:1, 136:2. 148: 8-9; Joel 2:13; Mic 7:18; Jas 5:11 [11] De 7:2,16,20:16 -17; Jos 6:21, 10:11, 19, 40, 11:6-20; ISa 6;19. 15:3; Na 1:2; Jer 13:14; Mt 8:12, 13:42, 50, 25:30, 41, 46; Mk 3:29, 2Th 1:8-9; Re 14:9-11, 21: 8 [12] Ge 6:6; Ex 32:14;1Sa 2:30-31, 15:11,35; 2Sa 24:16:2Ki 20: 1-6;Ps 106:45; Jer 42:10; Am 7:3; Jon 3:10 [13] Nu 23:19; ISa 15:29, Eze 24:14; Mal 3:6: Jas1:17 [14] Ge 11:7; Jg 9:23; 1Sa 16:14; La 3:38; 1Ki 22:22-23; Isa 45:7, Am 3:6; Jer 18:11,20:7; Eze 20: 25, 2 Th 2:11 [15] De 32:4; Ps 25:8, 100:5, 145:9; ICo 14:33 [16] Ge 9:22-25;Ex 20:5, 34:7;Nu 14;18; De 5:9; 2Sa 12:14; Isa 14:21, 65:6-7 [17] De 24:16; 2Ch 25:4; Eze 18:20 [18] The reader is referred to Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) Chapter 12. [19] Another argument is adduced in Atheism, pp. 293-297 [20] Roland Puccetti, "Is Omniscience Possible?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 1963, pp. 92 - 93 [21] Dr. Fernandes also argues that atheism "offers no solution to the problem." There must be a confusion here. The problem is how can there be so much evil if God exists. This is not a problem for atheists since they do not believe in God. [22] Again the reader is referred to Atheism, Chapter 16. [23] See my critique of Plantinga's solution to natural evil that used a similar strategy in Atheism, Chapter 16 [24] See Theodore Drange, "The Argument From Nonbelief," Religious Studies, 29, 1993, pp. 417-432. Drange is the first philosopher I know to develop and defend this argument in a systematic way. See also Theodore Drange, "The Arguments From Evil and Nonbelief", 1996 http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/aeanb.html [25] In Orthodox Judaism the question is why are there so many descendants of the Israelites who since the time of Moses have rejected one or more of the following: (1) There exists a being who rules the entire universe, (2) This Being has a chosen people, namely, the Israelites, (3) He gave them a set of laws, The Torah, He wants them to follow and which He wants their descendants to follow. [26] See Atheism, Chapter 9.
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