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LOGIC ARGUMENTS _________________________________________________________________________
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ARGUMENTS FOR ATHEISM 2
__________________________________________________________________________A Brief Survey of Evidential Arguments for AtheismJeffery Jay LowderA Brief Comment on TerminologyBefore discussing specific arguments for and against atheism, I think it would be useful to define some terms. In doing so I will adopt the definitions put forth by Professor Theodore M. Drange in his excellent essay, "Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism." Consider the sentence, "God exists." Do you think that sentence is meaningful? In other words, do you think that sentence is either true or false? If you think the sentence, "God exists" is a bunch of meaningless nonsense, you are a noncognitivist with respect to God-talk. (However, I don't recommend using that word at cocktail parties!) If you do think the sentence is meaningful, then ask yourself a follow-up question: is that sentence true or false? If you think that sentence is true or probably true you are a theist. (I discuss the arguments for theism elsewhere.) If you think that sentence is false or probably false you are an atheist. Finally, if you do not have a position on whether the sentence is true or false then you are an agnostic. By defining terms in the above manner, I am rejecting the definition of terms used by many atheists, where atheism is defined as simply the lack of theistic belief. Indeed, I used to also passionately defend that definition of atheism on Usenet. The only problem with that definition, however, is that nobody outside of nontheistic circles ever uses it. When the average "person on the street" uses the word "atheist," they mean someone who holds the belief that God does not exist. Thus, when nontheists use the word "atheism" in a nonstandard way, it makes communication with the general public difficult. And while it might be possible to persuade the general public to use the 'correct' definition of atheism, it would hardly be worth the effort. The primary dispute between theists and nontheists is whether God exists; we should focus our energy on that issue. However, one definitional matter remains. As Drange points out, the meaning of the words "theist," "agnostic," and "atheist" are relative to a concept of God. So before I survey the various evidential arguments for atheism, I need to specify which concept of God I'm considering. In this essay, "God" shall be defined as the creator of the physical universe, a disembodied person who is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and loving. My Cumulative Case for the Nonexistence of GodGiven the above definitions, I am an atheist in the full sense of the word. Not only do I lack the belief that God exists, I hold the opposite, positive belief that God does not exist. Since my atheism is not a mere lack of belief, I have a burden of proof to provide arguments or evidence for the truth of atheism just as much as a theist has the burden of proof to provide arguments or evidence for the truth of theism. Anti-atheists sometimes object that one would have to be omniscient in order to prove that God does not exist. However, as I argue elsewhere, a person does not have to be omniscient in order to prove that a concept is incoherent. If a concept entails a logical contradiction, one does not have to be omniscient in order to show that. Moreover--and this is a much more important point--I do not claim to be able to "prove" the nonexistence of God anyway. Instead, I present evidence which is much more likely if atheism is true than if theism is true. (In the jargon of the philosophy of religion, my arguments for atheism are all evidential arguments.) In what follows, I will outline a cumulative case for the nonexistence of God. Although I believe that each of my arguments constitute good, independent reasons for believing atheism and rejecting theism, my arguments are even stronger when considered together. My cumulative case for atheism includes the following arguments: 1. The History of Science. If there is a single theme unifying the history of science, it is that naturalistic explanations work. The history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of supernatural explanations replacing naturalistic ones. Indeed, naturalistic explanations have been so successful that even most scientific theists concede that supernatural explanations are, in general, implausible even on the assumption that theism is true. Such explanatory success is antecedently more likely on naturalism--which entails that all supernaturalistic explanations are false--than it is on theism. Thus the history of science is some evidence for atheism and against theism. See Keith M. Parsons, Science, Confirmation, and the Theistic Hypothesis (Ph.D. Dissertation, Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University, 1986), p. 46; Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (3rd ed., ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 223-224. 2. The argument from physical minds. Scientific evidence shows that consciousness and personality are highly dependent upon the brain. Nothing mental happens without something physical happening. That strongly implies that the mind cannot exist independently of physical arrangements of matter. In other words, we do not have a soul. And this is exactly what we would expect if naturalism is true. But if theism is true, then our minds should not depend on our brains for their existence; we should have souls. Also, if theism is true, then God is a disembodied mind; God's mind is not in any sense dependent on physical arrangements of matter. But if nothing mental happens without something physical happening, that is evidence against both the existence of souls and the existence of any being who is supposed to have a disembodied mind, including God. Therefore, the physical nature of minds is unlikely if theism is true, but what we would expect if naturalism is true. See Michael Tooley, "Opening Arguments" The Craig-Tooley Debate. 3. The argument from biological evolution. This argument assumes the truth of biological evolution; for a defense of that assumption, see the Talk.Origins archive. To be sure, biological evolution is logically compatible with theism; God could have used evolution to create life. But if theism were true, God could have also used many other methods to create life, methods which are impossible if atheism is true. In contrast, if atheism is true, evolution pretty much has to be true. Furthermore, since theism implies a metaphysical dualism, it is antecedently likely on theism that minds are fundamentally nonphysical entities and therefore that conscious life is fundamentally different from nonconscious life. But this in turn makes it likely that conscious life was created independently of nonconscious life--that evolution is false. Thus, the scientific fact of biological evolution is more likely on the assumption that atheism is true than on the assumption that theism is true. See Draper 1997, pp. 219-230. 4. The biological role of pain and pleasure. The naturalistic explanation for this is obvious. If animals are the products of evolution by natural selection, we would expect physical pain to aid survival. But not all physical pain and pleasure aids survival. For example, think of the horrible pain that inflicts many people with terminal illnesses. If atheism is true, this is what we would expect: evolution by natural selection is not an intelligent process; there seems to be no way for creatures to have evolved so that they only feel pain when it will aid survival. In contrast, if theism were true, God could "fine tune" humans so that they experience pain only when it is necessary for some greater good. If God did exist, what possible reason could he have for allowing people with terminal illnesses have to endure such agonizing pain until they finally die? The chances that such a reason would intersect with the biological goal of survival is pretty slim. Thus, the biological role of pain and pleasure is more likely on atheism than on theism. See Paul Draper, "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" Nous 23 (1989): 331-50. Republished in The Evidential Argument from Evil (ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996). 5. The flourishing and languishing of sentient beings. Only a fraction of living things, including the majority of sentient beings, thrive. In other words, very few living things have an adequate supply of food and water, are able to reproduce, avoid predators, and remain healthy. An even smaller fraction of organisms thrive for most of their lives, and almost no organisms thrive for all of their lives. If naturalistic evolution is true, this is what we would expect. If all living things are in competition for limited resources, then the majority of those organisms will not survive long enough to thrive. Moreover, even those organisms that do thrive for much of their lives will, if they live long enough, deteriorate. However, if theism is true, why would God create a world in which all sentient beings savagely compete with one another for survival? Does anyone really believe that this could be morally justified? The fact that so few sentient beings ever flourish is more likely on atheism than on theism. See Paul Draper, "A Darwinian Argument from Evil," unpublished paper. 6. Tragedies (or gratuitous evil). There are many examples of evil in the world which do not fit into any of the above categories but which nonetheless appear pointless. If theism were true, God could prevent tragedies in many different ways, ways that would not take away our free will or our ability to develop moral character. And despite centuries of theological reflection by some of the greatest minds in history, most theistic philosophers now admit they have no idea why God allows tragedies. Of course, it's logically possible that God has a reason for allowing tragedies, a reason we humans do not understand. But it's also logically possible that God has extra reasons for preventing tragedies, reasons we also do not understand. Clearly, then, tragedies are improbable on theism. But if atheism is true, there is no God who cares about our suffering; thus, we would expect tragedies. Therefore, tragedies are some evidence for atheism and against theism. 7. God's silence in the face of tragedies. Just as loving parents would, say, comfort a child undergoing chemotherapy, we would expect a loving God to comfort human beings who suffer as the result of tragedies. If theism is true, then God loves his creatures and wants all of his creatures to love Him in return. However, many people find it hard to love God when they do not understand the reasons for their suffering and God seems so far away. In other words, even if God has a reason for allowing tragedies, He could still comfort victims of suffering so that they know He loves them. Yet there are many victims of tragedies who report not feeling God's comforting presence. This is not at all what we would expect if theism were true. However, if atheism is true, we would expect victims of tragedies not to experience God's comforting presence for the simple reason that there is no God. Thus, God's silence in the face of tragedies is much more probable on atheism than on theism. See William Rowe, "The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look" in The Evidential Argument from Evil (ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 276; and Theodore M. Drange, Nonbelief and Evil (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1998), pp. 208-11, 223-24. 8. Religious and ethical confusion. Religious believers hold a wide variety of beliefs about the supernatural and the nature of God. Besides Christianity, there are many other religions, including Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, to name just a few. All of these world religions make different claims about the nature of God and about the religious path God wants us to take. Now let's suppose that you are an open-minded theist trying to decide which religious path to follow. Why should you choose one religious path over another? The answer to that question is far from obvious. But all this is pretty strange if theism is true. On theism, we would expect God to clearly reveal his plan for salvation so that there would no confusion about which religious path to take. However, if atheism is true, there is no God and therefore no reason to expect religious believers to agree on anything. Thus, religious confusion is evidence for atheism and against theism. Similarly, there is a huge amount of disagreement concerning what constitutes morally acceptable behavior (e.g., war, slavery, abortion, euthanasia, gun control, etc.). While I don't think this disagreement poses any problem for moral realism per se (contra J.L. Mackie), it seems to me that this disagreement does pose a problem for a theistic interpretation of moral realism. Given theism (and the moral realism it entails--see below), the fact of moral confusion is not what we would expect. But if atheism is true, there is no God to "set the record straight" on what is and is not ethical. Thus, ethical confusion is evidence for atheism and against theism. For a defense of the argument from religious confusion, see Theodore M. Drange, "The Arguments from Nonbelief and Confusion for the Nonexistence of God." For a defense of nontheistic moral realism, see Quentin Smith, Ethical and Religious Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 175-179. 9. The reasonableness of nonbelief. There are many people, including myself, who don't believe in God but who wish that some sort of a theistic God did exist. Now the Apostle Paul, in Romans 1:19-21, implies that the existence of God is just obvious to everyone, even atheists and agnostics. But just think about that for a second. How do you prove that something is obvious to another person? Lots of nonbelievers claim that the existence of God is not obvious to them. Indeed, many nonbelievers claim that it is just obvious that it is not obvious that theism is true! Why is this evidence for atheism over theism? Because if theism is true, we would expect belief in God to be obvious. What possible reason could God, if He existed, have for not revealing Himself? God is not shy, God is not busy, and so forth. But if atheism is true, there is no God and we would expect nonbelief to be reasonable. Therefore, I think reasonable nonbelief is much more likely on atheism than on theism, and that's my eighth line of evidence for atheism. See John L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Drange 1998. To see how this cumulative case for atheism fared in a debate with a theist, see the tape of my debate with Phil Fernandes. _________________________________________________________________________ Other Arguments for the Nonexistence of GodAstute readers will notice that my cumulative case for atheism does not attack the concept of God itself, but perhaps I am letting theism off the hook too easily. There is an entire family of arguments known as "incompatible-properties" arguments which attempt to derive a logical contradiction in the theist's conception of God. Drange, in his interesting article, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey," outlines ten such arguments. I am undecided about arguments of this type, as I have not really taken the time to seriously investigate them. If, however, such an argument were successful, it would be a tour-de-force for atheism with respect to the god in question. It would mean that the concept of God under consideration cannot exist; there would be zero probability that such a being existed. Other evidential arguments for atheism include the following: 1. The Meager Moral Fruits of Theism. Paul Draper used this argument in a debate with William Lane Craig on the existence of God. The moral fruits of theism are meager at best: theists do not seem to live more moral lives than atheists. Neither church history nor Draper's personal experience support the claim that theists are morally superior to atheists. On the assumption that theism is true, one has reason to believe that theistic belief has significant moral fruits, that worshipping God is a source of moral strength. Thus, on the assumption of theism, the fact that theists do not seem to live more moral lives than atheists is surprising. On the assumption that atheism is true, however, this is not surprising. On atheism, believing in God would not make people morally better. Draper now believes that there is insufficient sociological evidence to prove that theists do not live more moral lives than atheists. I have chosen to follow Draper's lead, so I do not include this argument in my cumulative case for atheism. 2. The Falsity of Moral Realism. Graham Oppy formulated this argument in a recent, perceptive article. Basically, this argument claims that if ethical or moral realism are false, that fact would be extremely strong evidence for atheism; theism requires that moral realism be true. To put the point another way, if it were really true that morality is nothing more than a subjective, human convention, then God does not exist. In my opinion, this is a valid argument. However, I do not include the argument in my cumulative case for atheism because I do not think it is sound; I accept moral realism. 3. The Principle of Conservatism. (What follows is largely a plagiarization of the relevant section of his speech.) According to the principle of conservatism, we should, where possible, avoid accounts of the world which postulate unusual or hitherto unknown things in order to explain what can be explained in terms of more intelligible and well-understood things. However, God is not visible, tangible or otherwise detectable by empirical means. God is supposed to act in space and time, but without having a location in space and time. His essence is, according to the tradition itself, ungraspable and fully beyond the comprehension of finite human minds. And yet belief in this incomprehensible being is supposed to make the present state of the world more intelligible. Everything observable is supposed to be created by God, but God Himself is uncreated. Furthermore, events in the observable world can generally be accounted for without introducing God as an explanation. Thunderstorms, earthquakes, plagues, eclipses, the variety of natural species, and even the origins of life itself all have detailed atheistic explanations, notwithstanding the fact that they were once thought to be the immediate work of God. In addition, the use of God as an explanation for anything seems bound to be problematic. We are told a great deal about Him, but never enough that claims that His existence can be put to the test. Imagine, for example, a farmer who prays to God for rain to help his drought-stricken crops. Suppose it then rains. Our happy farmer explains this as the act of God in response to a prayer. But suppose it doesn’t rain. The farmer explains this as God's having had other reasons for withholding rain. Either way, the God hypothesis seems to do no real explanatory work. It can be used to account for literally anything in exactly the same way. See Doug Jesseph, "Opening Arguments" The Jesseph-Craig Debate. 4. The Argument from Asymmetry. Doug Jesseph used this argument in his second debate with William Lane Craig. Believers in one concept of God tend to deny the existence of other god-concepts by using naturalistic explanations. We should be consistent and apply naturalistic explanations across the board. Naturalistic explanations work. Supernatural explanations don't. See my "Summary and Assessment of the Craig-Jesseph Debate." 5. Self-Centeredness and Limited Altruism of Human Beings. This argument is another one of Draper's biologically-based arguments for metaphysical naturalism (which entails atheism); what follows is largely plagiarized from Draper's paper. According to the argument, we are basically self-centered. Our tendency to behave in ways that promote our own welfare is typically much stronger than any tendency to act for the good of others. But, like many other animals, we will at times sacrifice our own interests for the sake of others. Such altruistic behavior can be divided into two types: kin altruism and non-kin or "social" altruism. Kin altruism is very easy to explain on Darwinian naturalism. Because I share as many as half my genes with my kin, characteristics like self-centeredness that help me survive and reproduce are not the only sorts of characteristics that can increase the likelihood that my genes will be passed down to future generations--characteristics like caring about my family members, which promote their survival and reproduction rather than my own, will also work. Thus, Darwinian naturalism can account for kin altruism and the various natural virtues that produce it. The origin of social altruism is tougher to explain. Since it is found only in humans and other higher mammals, perhaps it is a sort of byproduct of kin altruism and intelligence. It is certainly weaker in most humans than kin altruism as well as more frequently absent altogether, and this is not surprising on Darwinism. Notice also that it is typically very limited in scope. The less like Smith Jones is, the less likely it is Smith will be concerned about Jones's welfare. If, as Darwin thought, kin altruism is the basis for other sorts of altruism, then once again this is not surprising. In contrast, theism entails that God created human beings, either directly (e.g., special creation) or indirectly (e.g., theistic evolution). Since God is morally perfect, He would have good moral reasons for creating altruistic humans even if such behavior were never biologically useful, and He would not create self-centered humans unless He had, not just a biological reason, but also a morally sufficient reason to do so. And since God is omnipotent and omniscient, He could create goal-directed organic systems (including humans) without making them inherently self-centered. So theism entails both that God does not need self-centeredness to produce human goal-directed organic systems and that, if human are inherently self-centered, then God had good moral reasons for producing them, reasons that, for all we know antecedently, might very well be inconsistent with self-centeredness systematically contributing to the biological goals of those systems. Therefore, we would have much less reason on theism than on naturalism to be surprised if it turned out that human self-centeredness differed from other parts of organic systems by not systematically contributing to the biological goals of those systems. Hence, since the self-centeredness and limited altruism of humans does seem to contribute to the biological goals of humans, and is therefore some evidence for atheism and against naturalism. I do not include this argument in my cumulative case because it is not clear to me how it overcomes the free will defense (FWD). Perhaps this argument can overcome the FWD, but I would need to see how that could be done. See Paul Draper, "A Darwinian Argument from Evil," unpublished paper. 6. The Atheistic Cosmological Argument. This argument was formulated by Quentin Smith in a number of articles; it claims that Stephen Hawking's cosmology is evidence that God does not exist. However, I am not aware of any nontheistic philosopher who has endorsed Smith's argument in print. Moreover, one agnostic philosopher (Graham Oppy), has attacked the argument in print. According to Oppy, a central premise in Smith's argument is incoherent. Frankly, much of this debate is over my head and so I am an agnostic with respect to Smith's argument. 7. The Existence of Extraterrestrial Intelligence (ETI). In a Secular Web feature article, James Still argued that there is "no room for God in a universe teeming with life." I agree with Still that ETI would seem to pose a problem for traditional Christian doctrines. But, if we take Christian theism out of the discussion, it is not clear to me why ETI would be less probable on theism than on atheism. In order for ETI to count as evidence for atheism over and against theism, we would need some reason to believe that if theism were true, God would only create intelligent life on earth and nowhere else in the universe. But why believe that? Indeed, if theism were true, why should God create intelligent life or a physical universe at all? Why not just bask in His own glory? Moreover, UFO stories notwithstanding, there is no scientific evidence that ETI actually exists. Of course, the lack of evidence for ETI does not prove the nonexistence of ETI. But it does seem premature to proclaim, as Still does, that ETI is evidence for atheism, even if we grant the questionable premise in Still's argument. Serious Objections to AtheismObviously, there are many objections to atheism. Some of these objections are simply misunderstandings and are neatly addressed in the Atheism Web's "Introduction to Atheism." Other objections are much more serious. Arguments for the existence of God are a type of objection to atheism; I discuss them elsewhere. But apart from misunderstandings and theistic arguments, I think there are three objections to atheism which atheists ought to take seriously: Objection #1: If atheism is true, then we cannot justify inductive
reasoning. Objection #2: If atheism is true, there is no reason for behaving
morally if you can get away with behaving immorally. Second, if it were true that "atheists have no reason for behaving morally when they get away with behaving immorally," then there should be empirical evidence that purely secular societies have more crime and immoral behavior than theistic societies. Yet the available evidence does not seem to demonstrate that. Indeed, the evidence actually contradicts that prediction. As Adolf Grünbaum writes: Furthermore, comparison of the crime statistics in the predominantly theist U.S.A. with the largely irreligious countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia resoundingly discredits the recurring claim that the moral conduct of theists is statistically superior to that of secularists, let alone of secular humanists. A fortiori, these statistics belie the smug thesis that the fear or love of God is motivationally necessary, in point of psychological fact, to assure such adherence to moral standards and good citizenship as there is in society at large. Thus, the U.S.A. has by far the highest percentage of religious worshippers in its population of any Western nation, and presidents from Nixon to Clinton recurrently give prayer breakfasts. In Great Britain, for example, which has the Anglican state church, only about 3 percent of its citizens attend a place of worship, whereas in the U.S., the figure is approximately 33 percent, i.e., greater by a factor of eleven! In the U.S., about 90 percent of the population profess belief in God, whereas in Western Europe and Scandinavia the percentage is very considerably below 50 percent. Nor is the black population in the U.S., in which the crime rate is high, at all predominantly irreligious. Yet the percentage incidence of homicides and other crimes in the God-fearing U.S. is much higher than in the heavily secularized Western countries. And a corresponding disparity exists between the respective percentages of the prison populations in these societies. See Adolf Grünbaum, "The Povery of Theistic Morality" Science, Mind and Art (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 203-242; Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, Religion and Morality (trans. Batya Stein, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995), pp. 107-112; Theodore M. Drange, "Why Be Moral?"; and Richard Carrier, "Does the Christian Theism Advocated by J.P. Moreland Provide a Better Reason to be Moral than Secular Humanism?". Objection #3: Even if atheism is true, believing in God is still a
good bet. Recommended Related ResourcesBelow I recommend some resources which deal with atheism, pro and con. (Again, I link to sites which discuss arguments for the existence of God on another page.) Pro ·
The
Fernandes-Martin Debate on the Existence of God ·
Jesseph-Craig
Debate on the Existence of God ·
The
Drange-Wilson Debate ·
Formatted
Atheology by Cole Mitchell Con ·
"The
Folly of Denying God" by Hank Hanegraf ·
Leadership University's
"Origins" Site ·
FaithQuest ·
Southern California Center for
Christian Studies Ravi is extremely popular in Evangelical circles. Much of his anti-atheist apologetic work focuses on Objection #2. I have written a review of his book, Can Man Live Without God?.
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